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ABSTRACT
This study examines the relationship between employee voice
suppression by workplace authorities (i.e. supervisors) and the
formation of employees’ attitudes towards political authority. We
test whether the effect of experienced voice suppression by
supervisors on employees’ preference for authoritarian governance
is positive, negative or nonlinear. The hypotheses are tested on
original data gathered within the Dutch Work and Politics Survey
2017 (N = 7599), which allows for a wide range of demographic and
organisational control variables. The results favour a nonlinear
effect of suppression on employees’ authoritarianism. These results
support the notion that political attitudes are dynamic and that the







Parallel with the current increase in global political tensions, the concept of authoritarian-
ism is (re)gaining popularity, often appearing in headlines of both academic and popular
sources. Mainstream media use the term generously to describe certain political leaders
and their supporters, most commonly Trump (Chomsky, 2017; Frum, 2017; Taub, 2016),
Putin (Douglas, 2017; Kaylan, 2016) and Erdogan (Beesley, 2017; Cook, 2016; Stephan &
Snijder, 2017). In such circumstances, it is increasingly important to study factors that
explain support for authoritarianism. Specifically, this study sets out to examine the
effect of employee voice suppression by the supervisors on employees’ authoritarian
attitudes.
Authoritarianism is the attitude concerned with obedience to authority on the one
hand and individual autonomy on the other. Interpersonal differences in authoritarianism
are commonly explained trough the effects of upbringing (Altemeyer, 1988), genes
(Ludeke et al., 2013) and personality (Butler, 2000). However, other potential antecedents
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of authoritarianism remain under researched. Traditionally, authoritarianism is viewed as a
stable disposition, personality trait, or even a syndrome (Adorno et al., 1950), meaning that
one’s authoritarianism is not expected to vary much in adulthood. Contrary to this static
view we follow the notion that socialisation is a life-long process (Dawson & Prewitt,
1968; Sapiro, 1994) and argue that formative socialisation experiences in adulthood also
have an effect on authoritarianism. Thus, our study investigates the potential effect of
socialisation in adulthood on authoritarianism. We focus on the effect of workplace
social interactions as one of the primary sources of adult socialisation. Specifically, we
investigate how suppression of employees’ voices by the supervisor influences employees’
preferences for authoritarian political leadership.
We argue that voice suppression by supervisors – as the authority figures at the work-
place – affects employees’ attitudes toward workplace authorities, and that these attitudes
may generalize to attitudes regarding political authorities. The experience of voice sup-
pression by supervisors can be differently interpreted by suppressed employees, depend-
ing on a multitude of individual and contextual factors. Ultimately, perceived authoritarian
treatment by the supervisor, such as voice suppression, is likely an experience formative
for authoritarian attitudes. For example, suppression may incite fear or anger towards
the supervisor; and, in line with these emotions, justification of or aversion to workplace
authority. Authoritarian attitudes formed at the workplace due to experienced suppression
may spillover to authoritarian attitudes regarding society at large. While there is some
research on the relationship between structural work factors and political authoritarianism
(Kitschelt & Rehm, 2014; Lipset, 1959), we focus on the effect of specific interactions with
workplace authority on authoritarian attitudes.
Our approach not only sheds a different light on authoritarianism as a malleable atti-
tude rather than a personality trait or a stable ideology – it also emphasises the importance
of considering adult political socialisation at the workplace as a plausible factor in life-long
formation of political attitudes. We find that supervisor suppression indeed affects author-
itarian attitudes. However, the direction of this relationship depends on the experienced
severity of the suppression incidence. Employees who experienced suppression as very
severe hold more authoritarian attitudes than ones who did not experience suppression,
while those who experienced medium severity of suppression hold less authoritarian atti-
tudes. In the following sections, we explain the main concepts and outline the theoretical
rationale.
The effect of adult socialisation on authoritarianism
Authoritarianism can broadly be defined as an attitude characterised by belief in absolute
obedience or submission to someone else’s authority, as well as the administration of that
belief through the oppression of others (Altemeyer, 1981). Therefore, two dimensions of
authoritarianism can be distinguished: authoritarian submission (of oneself to the auth-
ority) and authoritarian aggression (through oppression of others).
Most explanations for individual differences in authoritarianism focus on the effects of
genetic factors and early parental socialisation. Findings of behavioural genetic research
suggest that approximately 50% of variance in political attitudes can be attributed to
genetic influence. For example, several studies independently confirmed that heritability
of conservatism is over 50% (Eaves et al., 1999; Martin et al., 1986; Bouchard, 2004). These
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studies imply that the remaining half of variance in the said political attitudes is affected by
environmental effects.
The influence of environmental factors on social attitudes, including political ones, is
referred to as socialisation. Socialisation is commonly defined as a process of learning
to participate in social life (Mortimer & Simmons, 1978). Extensive research has been
done on the influence of early parental socialisation on political attitudes (Achen,
2002; Dalton, 1980; Jennings et al., 2009). For example, studies consistently show
that children of parents holding authoritarian political attitudes tend to grow up to
hold authoritarian attitudes themselves (Altemeyer, 1988; Duriez et al., 2008; Duriez &
Soenens, 2009). This concordance can be at least partly attributed to parental socialisa-
tion (Bouchard & McGue, 2003). Namely, people who hold authoritarian attitudes in a
political sense tend to also apply an authoritarian parenting style (Peterson et al.,
1997; Rohan & Zanna, 1996), which entails close supervision, high demands, frequent
and harsh punishments, and a distinct hierarchy (Baumrind, 1968). The finding that
this parenting style tends to incite children’s authoritarianism is commonly interpreted
in psychological literature as children learning to conform to rules imposed on behalf of
authority. They also cease to develop their own strategies for coping with stressful
events or threats, relying on authority particularly in those instances, as it provides a
sense of security (Oesterreich, 2005). Furthermore, their anger toward the authoritarian
parents cannot be expressed; therefore, it is misplaced and manifests as authoritarian
aggression toward various ‘non-compliant’ groups and individuals (Adorno et al.,
1950; Milburn & Conrad, 2016). Thus, experiences with suppression in childhood
seem to amplify authoritarianism.
On the other hand, the influence of adult socialisation on authoritarianism is less
studied, as is the case with the effect of adult socialisation on political attitudes in
general. This lack is probably because children and adolescent attitudes are considered
malleable, while adult attitudes are considered relatively stable (Alwin & Krosnick, 1991;
Sears & Funk, 1999). However, the few longitudinal studies that had been conducted con-
clude that party identification is stable, but not fixed throughout adulthood (Lewis-Beck
et al., 2008), while basic political attitudes are even less stable (Alwin et al., 1991; Converse
& Markus, 1979; Stoker & Jennings, 2008). Therefore, more recent political socialisation
research draws attention to adult political socialisation. For example, Niemi and
Hepburn (1995) posit young adulthood as the critical period of political socialisation,
while Sears and Brown (2013) appeal for considering political socialisation throughout
the entire life span. Following these recent developments we argue that adult socialisation
may have an important effect on political attitudes such as authoritarianism, even though
perhaps not as strong as the effect of socialisation in the critical period of childhood. Thus,
we investigate what occurs when one experiences authoritarian behaviour in adulthood,
particularly at one’s workplace.
The spillover from the workplace to political life
Because work is central to people’s lives, both in terms of its importance and the time
spent on it, the workplace is one of the primary sources of adult socialisation (Greenberg
et al., 1996). We argue that attitudes formed at the workplace spill-over from the workplace
to the political realm. The literature on political behaviour offers at least three sociological
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mechanisms that explain how the workplace might have an effect on the political realm:
(1) skill development, (2) occupational autonomy and task structure, and (3) the workplace
as a facilitator of crosscutting discourses.
The first mechanism is the use of skills developed at the workplace in political life. The
idea is that involvement in organisational decision making enhances political skills
(Bandura, 1994; Carter, 2006; Greenberg et al., 1996). The mechanism claimed responsible
for this spillover is that people generalise problem-solving techniques developed and
practiced in the workplace and use them in other spheres of life, particularly in political
life (Kohn, 2001; as cited in Kitschelt & Rehm, 2014). This way, workplace participation
affects political participation.
The second work-to-politics spillover mechanism operates via ‘occupational autonomy
and task structure’ (Boix & Posner, 1998; Kohn, 1969; Oesch, 2008, 2014). The idea is that
the characteristics of one’s occupation, particularly people’s experiences with job auton-
omy and authority, are generalised and transposed to other social spheres and thus
form one’s political attitudes (Kitschelt & Rehm, 2014).
The third and final spillover mechanism is crosscutting discourse. The arena for political
deliberation at work is less subject to self-selection than one’s usual social environments,
and thus likely to induce encounters between people with differing viewpoints. Such
encounters increases political tolerance toward people with political perspectives other
than one’s own (Mutz & Mondak, 2006). Therefore, participation in crosscutting discourse
at work is expected to influence political attitudes.
What described three mechanisms have in common is generalization as the mechanism
underlying the spillover from workplace to political realm. Generalisation theory posits
that people transpose values, attitudes and behaviours developed and proved effective
in one social context to other contexts (Mortimer & Simmons, 1978). This is precisely
what is observed in the described workplace-to-politics spillover mechanisms: generalis-
ation of behaviour developed at the workplace in the first, and generalisation of attitudes
formed at the workplace in the second and third mechanism.
Building on this literature, we propose a new, fourth mechanism of generalisation from
workplace to political attitudes: generalization of interactions with workplace authority. This
mechanism assumes that attitudes towards workplace authority formed through inter-
actions with workplace authority generalise to attitudes towards political authority. We
believe interpersonal interactions between supervisors and employees reflect the occu-
pational autonomy and task structure. As such, the newmechanism we propose is a refine-
ment of the previously mentioned generalisation mechanism that describes the effect of
occupational autonomy and task structure on political attitudes. Kitschelt and Rehm (2014)
find that occupations with low skill and authority levels are associated with higher levels of
political authoritarianism. In this paper, we focus on social interactions that reflect work-
place authority (such as voice suppression), rather than on structural workplace character-
istics. This helps uncover more specific mechanisms underlying the spillover on political
attitudes, since authority relations are more clearly expressed through social interactions
than through formal hierarchical positions (Stanojevic et al., 2020). Moreover, generalis-
ation is more successful the more a certain stimulus or situation resembles the context
linked to the initial socialisation (Shepard, 1987). Since the supervisor is perceived as an
authority figure at the workplace, we argue that interaction with the supervisor can
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affect employees’ attitudes regarding workplace authority, which then generalise to atti-
tudes regarding authority on a societal level.
Perception of supervisor suppression as authoritarian behaviour
A crucial social interaction with the supervisor that may affect employees’ attitudes regard-
ing authority is voicing discontent with a problem at work. According to Hirschman (1970),
members of different kinds of organisations faced with an organisation-related problem
can react in one of two ways: with exit or voice. The same choice is available when an
employee is faced with a problem at work. While exit means simply leaving the
company, voice can take many forms. There is an impressive body of literature on the pre-
dictors and consequences of employee voice, in particular on employee’s voice, generally
understood as the expression of ideas, suggestions and opinions in order to improve work
and work organisations (Van Dyne & LePine, 1998). In the present study, we define voice as
any activity of individual employees, groups of employees or their representatives aimed
at improving either personal work conditions or the work conditions of an entire group
one belongs to. Thus, voice in our definition is exclusively directed at improving employ-
ment conditions for oneself or one’s group, such as signalling high work pressure, unsafe
working conditions, demanding higher wages or claiming unpaid wages. Examples of the
way of how employees can express their voice are raising the problem at work directly to
the supervisor or going on strike.
Supervisors can respond in several ways to employees voicing discontent. Depending
on the situation, supervisors might choose to support employees (e.g. by accommodating
them or complimenting the voicing act), to take a neutral stance (e.g. by explaining why
the problem cannot be solved), to punish the employee, or to ignore the problem and the
employee’s expression of it. We build on Tilley (1978) and define employee voice suppres-
sion as any supervisor’s attempt to discourage, prevent, or curtail the volume, intensity, or
duration of employees’ individual or collective voice. As such, employee voice suppression
can take many forms and can differ in severity. Following this definition, punishing and
ignoring employee voice can be considered suppressive responses to employee voice.
Moreover, research by Husband, Schenck, and Cooper (1988; as cited in Lobdell et al.,
1993) suggests that employees voicing discontent to their supervisor perceive this as
uncomfortable social interactions. This discomfort comes as no surprise considering the
findings of Cooper and Husband (1993), who find that employees often have the
impression that the supervisors are not willing to listen to their complaints, while super-
visors, on the contrary, far more often perceive that they are willing to listen. Lobdell
and associates (1993) build on this finding, and find additionally a negative relationship
between employees’ perception of supervisors’ willingness to listen and perceived super-
visors’ responsiveness. Given these findings, it is plausible that employees who voice work
related discontent to their supervisors are likely to perceive a lack of willingness to listen
and lack of responsiveness by the supervisors, which might be perceived as authoritarian
behaviour by the supervisors.
To the extent that employees perceive punishment and ignoring by the supervisor as
voice suppression, they might experience these events as authoritarian behaviour, com-
parable to previously mentioned parental authoritarianism. Such voice suppression is
likely to be perceived as perpetuating a strict hierarchical structure in which the authority
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is on top and does not adhere to the interests of employees lower in the hierarchy.
Employees who experience punishment by the supervisor in response to voice are
especially likely to perceive such a response as authoritarian behaviour, as suppression
is a defining characteristic of authoritarian behaviour, at least in regard to parenting
styles (Robinson et al., 1995). Therefore, we argue that experiences of workplace voice sup-
pression by the supervisor potentially affect employees’ authoritarianism, similar to how
authoritarian behaviour by parents directed toward children affects children’s
authoritarianism.
Thus, the research question this study attempts to answer is: how do these experiences
of suppression by the supervisor affect authoritarianism?
What spills over? How voice suppression affects authoritarianism
So far, we have argued that perceived suppression of employee voice by the supervisor
can be seen as authoritative behaviour and that such interaction with the supervisor
can affect authoritarian attitudes within the workplace context, and finally generalise to
societal-level authoritarian attitudes. However, the proposed generalisation mechanism
assumes nothing about how employee voice suppression by supervisors affects attitudes
towards authority. While it seems intuitive that perceived suppression by workplace auth-
ority would influence employees attitudes regarding workplace authority and generalise
to attitudes regarding political authorities, the direction of the effect in question is less
straight forward. Theoretically, opposing effects on authoritarian attitudes are plausible.
On the one hand, experiencing suppression by an authority figure at work could increase
employees’ authoritarianism, making people more submissive to authority. On the other
hand, suppression could actually decrease authoritarianism, making individuals auth-
ority-averse.
It is important to note that consequences of an objective event depend on ones’ sub-
jective interpretation of the event (Thomas & Thomas, 1928). In other words, employees’
subjective interpretation of experienced suppression incidence determines which
affective and cognitive mechanisms are offset. Since attitudes are conceptualised as con-
sisting of an affective, cognitive and behavioural component (Muran, 1991; Jain, 2014), we
assume affective and cognitive mechanisms triggered by suppression by authority affect
attitudes towards authority. These different potential affective and cognitive mechanisms
lead to competing hypotheses which we empirically test. In what follows, we present the
psychological mechanisms that explain the effect of suppression by the supervisor on
workplace authoritarianism, which ultimately generalises to political authoritarianism.
Several psychological theories predict that having experienced suppression induces
authoritarianism. First, suppression might incite fear, which is known to induce a rise in
authoritarianism. Studies have found a correlation between fear and authoritarian political
attitudes (Butler, 2013; Eigenberger, 1998). Some hypothesise that fear activates authori-
tarian tendencies because strict rules and hierarchical structures provided by authoritarian
systems restore people’s sense of safety (Oesterreich, 2005). Therefore, fear-provoking
events, such as workplace suppression, might increase one’s authoritarian submission
and suppression in the workplace context, which ultimately generalise to political
authoritarianism.
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Furthermore, system justification theory (Jost et al., 2004) claims that people are gen-
erally intrinsically motivated to defend and justify any system of which they are a part,
especially if that system disadvantages them. This is an unconscious tendency that
helps alleviate the discomfort of cognitive dissonance that would arise from holding nega-
tive attitudes toward a system one (albeit passively) sustains. In extreme cases of hostage
situations, a similar phenomenon is referred to as Stockholm syndrome, in which hostages
develop positive feelings and empathy toward their captors (McKenzie, 2004). This
behaviour is, similar to system justification, believed to be a spontaneous ego
defense strategy, which can also be adaptive. For hostages, the change in attitude
might increase the likelihood of obtaining freedom from captors, while for a suppressed
individual in an authoritarian system, the change in attitude might improve their coping
abilities with and within the system. In the case of employee voice suppression, system
justification theory would suggest that suppressed employees tend to justify the sup-
pression they are experiencing to reduce the cognitive dissonance between their atti-
tude and their behaviour. To justify the suppression, they might adapt a more
authoritarian attitude, meaning they might increase their favouring of submission to
authority at work and hostility toward people who do not submit to it. This increased
authoritarian attitude adaptive for the suppressive workplace context may then gener-
alise into authoritarianism as a political attitude. Thus, based on the generalisation of
workplace fear, observational learning, workplace role and system justification, we for-
mulate Hypothesis 1:
Compared to employees who are not subjected to suppression, employees subjected to voice
suppression have higher levels of authoritarianism.
While the above psychological mechanisms predict a positive effect of voice suppres-
sion on authoritarianism, suppression of voice by authority could also lessen peoples’
readiness to submit to authority and punish on its behalf, thus decreasing employees’
authoritarianism. Suppression by the supervisor might also incite anger (rather than
fear) toward workplace authority and, therefore, workplace system aversion (rather than
system justification). This possibility is not only intuitive on the basis that suppression is
an unpleasant experience with authority, which might lead to a negative affect and atti-
tudes toward authority. It is also supported by findings of social movements research.
The social movements and mobilisation literature elaborates on this logic in the context
of state suppression of protests. Gurr (1970) and Oberschall (1973) argue that suppression
will lead to new grievances and negative emotions (mainly anger) for the suppressed pro-
testers, especially when the suppression is considered illegitimate. This may be why, in
many cases, state suppression in an attempt to stop a protest actually resulted in exacer-
bating it (Bayat, 2003; Sinjab, 2013). Therefore, it is plausible to assume that in some cases
suppression of voice by the supervisor would result in rejecting workplace authority, and
such attitude change may generalise to rejecting political authorities, thereby reducing
authoritarianism. Following these suggestions from the mobilisation literature, we formu-
late Hypothesis 2 as follows:
Compared to employees who are not subjected to suppression, employees subjected to voice
suppression have lower levels of authoritarianism.
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Alternatively, some authors hypothesised a nonlinear, inverted U-shaped effect of state
suppression on protest intensity, which suggests that moderate suppression causes an
increase in protest intensity, while extreme suppression causes protests to decline in inten-
sity. The evidence on this is mixed: Hibbs (1973) and Francisco (1996) refuted the inverted
U hypothesis, but Muller and Weede (1990) confirmed it. Despite the mixed empirical evi-
dence, the theoretical reasoning for this hypothesis is that, moderate levels of suppression
incite protests by creating new grievances, but the risks of protesting become too high as
the suppression further increases toward the highest level; thus, protests quell (Johnston,
2012).
We follow this line of reasoning and theorise that employees’ authoritarianism depends
on the subjective impact of experienced suppression. Although to our knowledge no
research examines the possible decrease in protesters’ authoritarianism after governmen-
tal suppression, we assume that protesting an authoritarian government is inversely
related to authoritarianism and that the empirical findings on increased protesting after
government suppression indicate aversion to authoritarianism. Thus, we expect that
voice suppression at work leads to new grievances and negative emotions towards auth-
ority, and therefore decreases employees’ authoritarianism, at least for medium subjective
impact of suppression. Further, following the finding of social movements research that
extremely high levels of state suppression curb protests, we expect that high subjective
impact of suppression would leave employees with little choice but to adapt to the sup-
pressive environment by aligning their attitudes to the authoritarian organisational
climate.
In terms of emotional responses, we argue that moderate suppression elicits anger,
while the highest levels of perceived suppression elicit fear. Anger and fear are similar
emotions but differ in one’s perception of the ability to act, control or change the situation
(Lerner & Tiedens, 2006). Therefore, if employees feel like they can (re)act (as with moder-
ate levels of suppression), they would likely experience anger toward the suppressive
authority. However, if employees perceive (re)action as too dangerous and have no
control over the events in the company (as a consequence of severe suppression), they
would likely experience fear of the suppressive authority.
In response to fear related to high impact of suppression, system justification may be
employed, as it alleviates anxiety, uncertainty, and fear elicited by threats to the societal
status quo (Fergina et al., 2010). Due to justifying the authoritarian organisational
system, employees highly impacted by the suppression experience would adapt to the
submissive role they are expected to enact within it, and even imitate the supervisor’s sup-
pressive behaviour. These are adaptive psychological mechanisms that help coping with
high-intensity suppression. By accepting one’s role and the system, the employee
reduces the risk of further suppression. Similarly, by imitating the suppressive employee’s
behaviour toward coworkers, employees might help keep the entire group of workers out
of trouble. Generalisation of these behaviours and attitudes formed as an adaptation to a
suppressive workplace would finally cause employees to adapt more authoritarian political
attitudes.
We do not expect an effect of low levels of subjective impact of suppression on author-
itarianism, as a low level of employers’ authoritarian behaviour is generally expected and
accepted as a manifestation of corporate hierarchy. Rather, we expect an effect only of
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medium and high subjective impact of suppression, in opposite directions. Thus, we for-
mulate Hypothesis 3 as follows:
Compared to employees who are not subjected to suppression, employees who report
medium subjective impact of suppression have lower levels of authoritarianism, while those




To test these hypotheses, we use the Work and Politics 2017 Dataset created for the purpose
of the ‘Linking the Discontented Employee and Discontented Citizen’ research project, of
which our study is a part (Akkerman, Manevska, Sluiter & Stanojevic, 2017). The data were
collected by administering the web-based questionnaire to 7599 Dutch citizens. Because
the research aims to study the spillover from the workplace to political preferences, we
limited our sample to the labour force (meaning working or looking for work). This prerequi-
site also limited the age range, so all participants were between 15 and 67 years old. The
survey was conducted by a professional survey company (Kantar Public) that maintains a
panel of households from which they recruit survey participants. The recruitment of partici-
pants is done via traditional recruitment methods, so every person in society has an equal
chance of being recruited. These panels are regularly updated to enable high response rates,
and participants receive monetary incentives. For the survey developed for the present
study, participants were recruited from a randomly sampled panel of 145,000 households
(approximately 235,000 respondents) in a manner that ensured representativeness with
regard to age, gender and education. Potential participants received an email inviting
them to participate in a survey that takes no longer than 20 min. Out of 12,013 approached
participants, 7599 participants filled out the survey, which accounts for a 64% response rate.
The current analysis is conducted on 6414 cases, which means an additional 15% of the
sample was excluded. This is because some participants could not answer the relevant
questions (not employed in the past 3 years, do not have a contract, or do not have a
supervisor).
Measures
To measure authoritarianism, we constructed a scale by selecting and adapting items from
existing authoritarianism scales (Altemeyer, 1998; Rattazzi et al., 2007; Zakrisson, 2005).
Since the study aims to examine the effect of workplace suppression on authoritarianism
as a political attitude, the authoritarianism items are focused on ideas about proper organ-
isation of the society, rather than more ‘personal’ reflections of authoritarian tendencies
such as those related to child rearing. Furthermore, following the recent work of Van
Hiel et al. (2006) we allow for the possibility of left wing authoritarianism, and therefore
select items that are applicable across the political spectrum. Although the initial set of
items included an equal number of items focused on authoritarian submission and aggres-
sion, after examining the items’ content and the results of principal component analysis,
the final scale was constructed from 4 submission and 1 aggression items, loading on one
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general factor of authoritarianism (for the detailed process of constructing authoritarian-
ism scale see Appendix, Tables A1 and A2). This result should come as no surprise not only
because there is a considerable similarity between the content of submission and aggres-
sion items but also because submission and aggression were often empirically found to
constitute a single dimension (Rattazzi et al., 2007). Although the two dimensions are
theoretically distinguishable, the theory also predicts that the same people who score
high on submission score high on aggression. The final scale thus contains 5 items with
a Cronbach’s alpha of .81.
To measure employee voice suppression by supervisors, the main explanatory variable,
as a first step, participants were asked whether they had experienced discontent with a
problem at work during the past three years. Subsequently, all respondents who reported
one or more forms of discontent were asked whether they voiced this problem, and if yes,
how. Participants who indicated having had a problem and who voiced this to their super-
visor were then presented with a list of possible supervisor responses, so they could recog-
nise responses they experienced. This list consisted of two supportive, two neutral and
nine suppressive responses (see Appendix, Table A3), presented to participants mixed
within one list of possible responses to voice. The nine suppressive responses were con-
structed based on previous findings (Bernhardt et al., 2009), expert judgement, and a
pilot study (N = 440). Additionally, participants could indicate supervisor responses they
experienced that were not covered by the list, which were subsequently judged by
experts to determine if they correspond to suppression or not. Participants could indicate
having experienced multiple types of suppression from the listed ones. From these
responses, we constructed a dichotomous variable indicating suppression, for which 1
indicates having experienced at least one of the nine suppressive responses, while 0 indi-
cates not having experienced any of the suppressive responses (including employees who
did not have an issue at work, had an issue but have not voiced to the supervisor, or voiced
it and experienced a supportive or a neutral response).
In addition to the dichotomous measure, we use a continuous measure of suppression
that captures the subjective impact of suppression. Although some types of suppression
(e.g. bullying or threatening) cause on average greater subjective impact than others (e.g.
ignoring), as shown in Table A3 of the Appendix, subjective impact also depends on the
individual characteristics of the suppressed employee. Namely, the same suppression inci-
dence could be interpreted differently by different employees, and therefore affect them
in different ways. Therefore, it is important to account for subjective impact of suppression.
After indicating their supervisor’s response, participants were asked to indicate how much
they feel each type of suppression they reported affected them on a scale from 1 to 5
(using a Dutch phrase that implies emotional impact), where 1 corresponds to ‘it did
not affect me at all’, and 5 to ‘it affected me very much’. The subjective impact of suppres-
sion measure was computed using the maximum subjective impact of suppression score
participants reported among all of the experienced instances of suppression (1–5), while 0
was assigned to participants who did not experience suppression. Thus, in cases of partici-
pants who reported having experienced multiple instances of suppression, subjective
impact of suppression reflects the highest impact participant had reported. This
measure contains all information contained in the dichotomous suppression variable,
with the additional aspect of subjective impact (as participants who had a score of 0 on
the dichotomous variable have a score of 0 on the subjective impact variable as well,
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while those who scored 1 on the dichotomous measure have a score ranging from 1 to 5
on the subjective impact measure).
We controlled for gender, age, education, the type of employment contract, union
membership,1 sector, whether employees are supervisors themselves, and the number
of work hours per week. Educational data were collected according to 8 ordinal categories
but split into low, middle and high for the analysis. The sector was determined based on
the Standard Industrial Classification (United Nations, 2008) as private or public. We con-
trolled for several types of contract, including temporary with a prospect of a permanent
contract, temporary without such a prospect, solo self-employed (freelancers’), and con-
tracts with flexible arrangements (including working for a temp agency, working on a
on call or zero hour contract). Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics of the variables
used in the analyses, and Table 2 the correlations between them.
Results
We first test a null-model, predicting authoritarianism only using control variables. Table 3
shows that having lower or middle education level and working more hours per week are
both related to higher authoritarianism, while having a temporary contract is related with
lower authoritarianism. Next, in Model I we test Hypotheses 1 and 2 using OLS regression
analysis. To test the effect of suppression on authoritarianism we use the dichotomous
measure of suppression, which signifies whether (1) or not (0) respondents were subjected
to suppression by supervisors. Using this dichotomous measure, we find no significant
difference between employees who experienced suppression, and those who did not as
shown in Table 3. Furthermore, we find that Model I, which uses the dichotomous suppres-
sion measure, does not explain the variance in authoritarianism any better than Model 0,
which uses only control variables. Thus, the mere occurrence or absence of voice
Table 1. Descriptive statistics.
Variable n M SD
Suppression dummy 6619 0.13 –
Subjective impact of suppressiona 7599 0.47 1.36
Authoritarianism 7599 3.30 0.70
Lower level education 6691 0.10 –
Middle level education 6691 0.47 –
Weekly work hours 6691 31.60 11.97
Age (0 = 15 years) 7599 25.94 13.35
Gender 7599 0.47 –
Solo self employed 6691 0.04 –
Temp. w/o prospect 6610 0.09 –
Temp. w/ prospect 6610 0.11 –
Flexible contract 7599 0.28 –
Sector 6691 0.64 –
Supervisor themselves 6691 0.25 –
Union membership 7599 0.16 –
Union missing 7599 0.21 –
Valid N (listwise) 6414
Notes: Suppression dummy: 1 = suppressed; gender: 1 = women; sector: 1 = private.
aThe subjective impact of suppression variable was constructed by assigning all employees who did not experience sup-
pression (whether because they had no problem to voice, because they had a problem but did not voice it, or because
they voiced but were not suppressed) were assigned 0 on the scale of subjective impact of suppression, while those who
did voice were assigned a maximum score they indicated as subjective impact (ranging from 1 to 5). This allows using the
variable as a predictor in regression analysis.
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Table 2. Correlation matrix.
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
1 . Suppression dummy 1 – −.020 −.006 −.031* .050*** .041** −.001 .023 .003 .044*** −.016 −.012 .039** .001 .001
2. Subjective impact of
suppressionX
1 .003 −.013 −.027* .048*** .04**5* .016 −.024 .005 .041** −.019 −.021 .033* −.004 .008
3. Authoritarianism 1 .124*** .187*** .021 .029* −.044*** −.041*** −.6*** −.002 −.004 .068*** .011 .005 −.004
4. Lower level education 1 −.316*** −.059*** −.008 −.060*** −.026* .040** .023 .089** .416*** −.063*** .019 −.007
5. Middle level education 1 −.063*** .028* −.013 .061*** .010 .000 .015 .098*** −.042** −.017 .013
6. Weekly work hours 1 −.167*** −.369*** −.013* −.225*** .014 −.293*** .105*** .238*** .002 .005
7. Age 1 −.089*** .037*** −.235*** −.189*** −.27***0 −.128*** .059*** .007 .003
8. Gender 1 −.043** .067*** .011 .025* −.282*** −.176*** .004 −.024
9. Solo self employed 1 −.049*** −.064** −.128*** .041** .014 −.001 .004
10. Temp. w/o prospect 1 −.005 −.492*** .072*** −.094*** .012 −.006
11. Temp. w/ prospect 1 .058*** .045*** −.040** .027* −.030*
12. Flexible contract 1 .141*** −.109*** .019 −.005*
13. Sector 1 .072 −.016 .020
14. Supervisor themselves 1 −.017 −.004
15. Union membership 1 −.226***











suppression has neither a significant positive nor negative effect on employees’ authori-
tarianism, therefore refuting both Hypothesis 1 (predicting positive effect) and Hypothesis
2 (predicting negative effect).
While the dichotomous measurement of suppression treats all suppressive responses
of the supervisor as being equally severe, the subjective impact of suppression
measurement allows for assessing the experienced intensity of suppression. In the
remainder of this section, we report on the tests of our hypotheses with this
measure of suppression.
Table 3. Results of regression analysis predicting authoritarianism: model 0 using only control
variables, and model 1 using occurrence or absence of suppression, N = 6610.
Authoritarianism
Model 0 Model I
Predictors B Std. Error B Std. Error
Suppression (dummy) −.005 .025
Lower level education .477*** .030 .477*** .030
Middle level education .351*** .018 .351*** .018
Age (0 = 15 years) .000 .001 .000 .001
Gender −.007 .019 −.007 .019
Solo self-employed −.085* .042 −.085* .042
Temporary w/o prospect −.317*** .032 −.131*** .032
Temporary w/ prospect −.018 .027 −.019 .027
Flexible contract .022 .022 .022 .022
Sector .022 .019 .022 .019
Weekly work hours .002* .001 .002* .001
Union membership .010 .023 .010 .024
Union missing −.009 .021 −.009 .021
Supervisor themselves .035 .020 .034 .020
(Constant) 3.025 .046 3.025 .046
Notes: Adjusted R2 = .077, Adjusted R2 = .077.
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001.
Table 4. Results of regression analysis predicting authoritarianism with subjective impact of
suppression, N = 6610.
Authoritarianism
Model II Model III
Predictors B Std. Error B Std. Error
Squared subjective impact of suppression .026** .008
Subjective impact of suppression .005 .006 −.114** .036
Lower level education .478*** .030 .478*** .030
Middle level education .352*** .018 .351*** .018
Age .000 .001 .001 .001
Gender −.008 .019 −.011 .019
Solo self-employed −.084* .042 −.085* .042
Temporary w/o prospect −.132*** .032 −.132*** .032
Temporary w/ prospect −.019 .027 −.020 .027
Flexible contract .022 .022 .022 .022
Sector .022 .019 .023 .019
Weekly work hours .002* .001 .002* .001
Union membership .010 .023 .010 .023
Union missing −.009 .021 −.011 .021
Supervisor themselves .034 .020 .036 .020
(Constant) 3.025 .046 3.032 .046
Adjusted R2 = .077 Adjusted R2 = .079
*P < .05; **P < .01; ***P < .001.
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To test Hypothesis 3 on the nonlinear effect of different levels of suppression, we test a
linear (Model II) and a quadratic (Model III) OLS regression model. The results in Table 4,
Model II refute the prospect of a linear effect of subjective impact of suppression on
authoritarianism, as predicted in Hypotheses 1 and 2. Conversely, the results of testing
Model III confirm the presence of a quadratic effect (as both the squared and the linear
effect of subjective impact of suppression are significant). We observe that, in the function
form f (x) = ax2 + bx + c, our model can be expressed as f (x) = 0.026 × 2− 0.114x + 3.032,
which indicates a parabola. If a > 0 (as in our case where a = 0.026), the parabola opens
upwards. The fitted regression line with confidence intervals shown in Figure 1 confirms
this U-shaped relationship. Thus, these results confirm Hypothesis 3 on the nonlinear
effect of subjective impact of suppression on employees’ authoritarianism, whereby
medium subjective impact of suppression is associated with lower, and high subjective
impact with higher authoritarianism compared to the employees who were not sup-
pressed. As a robustness check, we also conduct a regression with dummies for each
level of subjective impact of suppression. The results of this analysis are in line with the
results of nonlinear regression model and can be found in the Appendix, Table A4.
Discussion and conclusion
We investigated the spillover of suppression of employee voice by the supervisor to
authoritarianism. We analysed the responses of employees on a questionnaire regarding
their experiences of suppression by supervisors and their (dis)agreement with statements
on authoritarianism. We find no difference in authoritarianism if we only distinguish
Figure 1. Fitted regression line with confidence intervals.
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between people who experienced and those who have not experienced suppression by
the supervisor. However, examining the subjective impact of suppression reveals a non-
linear relationship between suppression and authoritarianism: in line with hypothesis 3
based on the empirical findings of the social movements research, employees who
reported medium subjective impact of suppression exhibit lower levels of authoritarianism
compared to those who did not experience suppression, whereas those employees who
reported high subjective impact of suppression exhibit higher levels of authoritarianism.
Such U-shaped relationship indicates that a medium experienced subjective impact of
suppression incites frustration and anger towards workplace authority, thus reducing
the tendency to hold authoritarian attitudes. High experienced subjective impact of sup-
pression, however, incites fear because the consequences of confronting workplace auth-
ority are experienced as severe. Therefore, high subjective impact of suppression offsets
adaptive responses to fear – system justification, imitation and role assignment. Once atti-
tudes concerning the workplace authority are formed, they generalise to attitudes con-
cerning political authority due to the similarity of the two social contexts.
Our study offers valuable insights in at least four respects. Firstly, the association found
between the impact of employee voice suppression and authoritarianism suggests that
authoritarianism is not necessarily a stable disposition or personality trait, as traditionally
assumed, but that experiences in adulthood can serve as formative for people’s authoritar-
ianism. This finding also supports the more recent adult socialization approach to political
attitudes (Dekker & Meyenberg, 1999), particularly the workplace socialization approach
(Greenberg et al., 1996).
Secondly, our study offers an alternative, ‘social’ approach to the known ‘structural’
approach to workplace socialisation, emphasising interactions with workplace authority
as formative political socialisation experiences. While previous studies focus on static
work characteristics, such as task structures, occupation and job security (e.g. Kitschelt &
Rehm, 2014; Kohn & Schooler, 1969), our study suggests an alternative mechanism –
namely, the generalisation of attitudes formed through interactions with workplace auth-
ority. This shift of focus from the structures to interactions is in line with Clegg et al. (2006),
who point out that interactions are key signifiers of power relations.
Furthermore, our finding is of practical importance, because workplace interactions
between supervisors and employees are easier to influence than organisational structures,
for instance through procedures or awareness-training of supervisors. Awareness of the sub-
jective impact of suppression by the supervisor is important because of its potential far
reaching consequences. Ideally, awareness about the possible emotional and political con-
sequences of voice suppression would incite conscious, careful consideration of ways in
which they respond to voice, especially since the consequences cannot be foreseen (i.e.
depending on both the specific instance of suppression and employees’ subjective interpret-
ation of it). Asmentioned in themeasures section, our data reveals that different examples of
supervisors’ reactions to voice elicit differing average intensities of emotional response, but
also that some variability per specific supervisors’ response (see Appendix, Table A3),
meaning that employees differ in their subjective affective interpretation of the same per-
ceived supervisor response. This might imply that it is not only important which specific
supervisor response is given in reaction to voice, but other factors that might influence
the subjective interpretation of such response play a role (i.e. workplace climate, job satisfac-
tion, previous interactions with the supervisor and other contextual factors).
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Lastly, our micro-level theory on the spillover of interactions at the workplace warns of
the potential far reaching consequences of recent labour market trends. Several recent
labour market developments have changed the employees’ position vis à vis the supervi-
sor, increasing their susceptibility to suppression. Here, we name two. Firstly, European
labour markets in particular have witnessed a change from traditional permanent con-
tracts to more flexible contract forms (part-time work, teleworking, flexible and fixed con-
tracts, pay-rolling, and temporary agent hiring). Traditional vehicles for collective
expressions of discontent, e.g. union representation or works councils, are less suitable
for these flexible workers (Jansen et al., 2017; Jansen & Akkerman, 2014). Therefore,
these workers must rely on individual voice, which makes them vulnerable to suppression
(Sluiter et al., 2020). Secondly, since the creation of the internal EU market, the free flow of
labour has facilitated labour migration across EU member state borders. Given their (initial)
language disadvantages, lack of union representation and frequent relocation, labour
migrants have a vulnerable position in the labour market, and examples of the exploitation
of labour migrants abound (SCP, 2013). These labour market developments fundamentally
change employees’ position in the organisation and potentially increase the likelihood of
experiencing voice suppression by the supervisor. Our findings suggest that these labour
market trends can affect political trends. For example, increased instances of suppression
that are perceived as severe or threatening might drive a surge in authoritarian attitudes.
Turning to limitations, the cross-sectional design of our study prompts some caution
with regard to causality claims. In this case, a third variable could be at play affecting
both authoritarianism and subjective impact of suppression, or previous levels of author-
itarianism may affect subjective impact of suppression. We attempted to reduce the
chances of the former by controlling for eight relevant potential confounders. As for
potential reversed causality, we believe that the findings support the interpretation that
suppression affects employees’ authoritarianism instead of vice versa. If authoritarianism
were to affect how people experience suppression, we would expect that the more author-
itarian people are, the more accepting of suppression by authority they may be. Thus, if
employees’ authoritarianism is affecting their subjective impact of suppression, we
would expect highly authoritarian employees to be less subjectively impacted by the
experience of suppression. Conversely, employees low on authoritarianism would experi-
ence stronger subjective impact of suppression, because they would not perceive it as
legitimate. However, this is not the pattern we find. Conversely, high levels of authoritar-
ianism are connected with a high (rather than low) subjective impact of suppression, and
low levels of authoritarianism with a medium (rather than high) subjective impact. We
therefore tentatively conclude that our findings support the causal effect of suppression
by supervisors on authoritarianism.
Another limitation is the inability to empirically test the theorised mechanisms we
assumed drive the effect of suppression on attitudes towards workplace authority. We
theorised that medium subjective impact of suppression would elicit anger toward auth-
ority and corresponding adaptive reactions to suppression in situations when one feels in
control, while high subjective impact would elicit fear and corresponding mechanisms
adaptive when one does not feel in control. While the findings certainly suggest that
different mechanisms must be at work at different levels of subjective impact of suppres-
sion, the current study design does not allow for an empirical test of the proposed five
mechanisms (fear, role enactment, imitation, system justification and anger).
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Notwithstanding these limitations and suggestions for further research, our study
shows that experiences with suppression of voice by the supervisor influence employees’
authoritarianism, the direction of the association being dependent upon the impact of
suppression. This finding is important for the literature on adult political socialisation,
especially the role of interactions with workplace authority and its spillover to politics.
Additionally, it shows the practical importance of workplace interactions between super-
visors and employees, and its potential impact on politics.
Note
1. The data on union membership was – retrospectively – collected at a later time point than the
other variables (Akkerman, Geurkink, Manevska, Sluiter & Stanojevic, 2018). Due to panel attri-
tion, by this point 1591 participants dropped out of the study, so we were unable to obtain the
information on their union membership. Thus, in order to control for it we included a dummy
variable for the missing cases on union membership, alongside the dummy for union
membership.
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Appendix
Even though theoretically authoritarianism consists of aggression and submission, previous research
rarely empirically established these as separate dimensions (Altemeyer, 1981, 1988, 1998; Rattazzi
et al., 2007). Arguably, authoritarian aggression in practice implies a certain degree of submission,
and vice versa. Thus, when items that focus on submission and aggression make up a single
factor, it should come as no surprise.
However, our initial analysis suggests two factors: the first five items loading on the first, and the
last three items loading on the second factor. Examining content of the items led to the conclusion
that the last three items load separately not because they tap into authoritarian aggression, but
because they imply physical violence and might therefore measure a different, violent tendency.
Item number five also measures authoritarian aggression, but does not have the violent component,
so it loads together with the submission items. Therefore, we decided to construct the authoritarian-
ism scale using the first 5 items suggested by the principal component analysis, as they represent
both submission and aggression, and are not confounded with the factor of violence favorability.
Table A2 presents the principal component analysis on the final set of items.






1. Obedience and respect for authority are the most important values
children should learn.
.638 −.010 .400
2. The law must always be adhered to, even if a particular law is wrong. .519 −.001 .269
3. What this country needs is a strong leader. .737 −.083 .491
4. A country can best be ruled by order and strict rules. .773 .035 .625
5. People who violate the law must be punished very strictly. .646 .115 .504
6. It is the duty of every citizen to eliminate people who endanger the
public order
.279 .438 .389
7. The state may use violence against its citizens to guard the public
order
.006 .745 .551
8. Using violence can be lawful when it comes to a noble political goal −.046 .676 .429




1. Obedience and respect for authority are the most important values children should
learn.
.634 .401
2. The law must always be adhered to, even if a particular law is wrong. .522 .273
3. What this country needs is a strong leader. .694 .481
4. A country can best be ruled by order and strict rules. .801 .641
5. To make society work well, it is necessary to punish people who violate the law very
strictly.
.678 .472
Table A3. Full list of items measuring supervisors’ response to employee voice, with frequencies and






Support 1 My supervisor helped me solve the problem 1272 3.93
Support 2 I got a compliment from my supervisor 414 4.10
Neutral 1 My supervisor gave a good explanation for the problem 897 3.58
(Continued )







Neutral 2 My supervisor said not much could be done 1112 3.54
Suppression 1 My supervisor ignored the problem 484 3.93
Suppression 2 I got criticism from my supervisor 289 4.09
Suppression 3 My supervisor did not want me to talk about the problem 130 3.99
Suppression 4 My supervisor put my career in the way (e.g. by denying me a promotion or
removing training / training opportunities)
152 4.36
Suppression 5 I was fired / my contract was not renewed 131 4.24
Suppression 6 My supervisor gave me a bad review in the performance interview 119 4.52
Suppression 7 I received an official warning / punishment 37 4.27
Suppression 8 My supervisor bullied / threatened me 57 4.65
Suppression 9 My supervisor made my job unpleasant 158 4.64
Table A4. Results of regression analysis predicting authoritarianism with subjective impact of
suppression. Reference group: no suppression, N =6691.
Authoritarianism
Model III
Predictors B Std. Error
Subjective impact of suppression, level 1 −.069 .155
Subjective impact of suppression, level 2 .054 .103
Subjective impact of suppression, level 3 −.222*** .061
Subjective impact of suppression, level 4 −.030 .044
Subjective impact of suppression, level 5 .070* .036
Lower level education .478*** .031
Middle level education .352*** .018
Age (0 = 15 years) .001 .001
Gender −.005 .019
Solo self-employed −.133 .116
Temporary w/o prospect −.127*** .029
Temporary w/ prospect −.020 .027
Flexible contract −.006 .022
Sector .022 .019
Weekly work hours .002* .001
Union membership .018 .024
Union missing −.023 .021
Supervisor themselves .025 .020
(Constant) 3.051 .041
Adjusted R2 = .077
Notes: The results shown in Table A4 indicate a negative effect of level 3 of subjective impact of suppression and a positive
effect of level 5. Thus, this analysis also supports Hypothesis 3 that predicts employees subjected to medium levels of
suppression to have lower levels of authoritarianism, while those subjected to the highest level of suppression to
have higher levels of authoritarianism than those who did not experience suppression.
*P < .05; **P < .01; ***P < .001.
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